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Abstract
We discuss intergenerational resource allocations in production
economies with long-run negative externality. The long-run negative
externality implies that the emission of public bads by the current
generation only aﬀects his future generation’s welfare, and the current
generation only suﬀers from the negative externality accumulated by
his past generations. We introduce the basic axioms of economic eﬃ-
ciency, intergenerational equity, and environmental sustainability, and
examine whether there exists an allocation rule which satisﬁes these
basic axioms. Unfortunately, our answer to this question is negative.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D71, I31
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider intergenerational resource allocations in production
economies with joint production of public bads. The technological character
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1in this production model is that the emission of the public bad is unavoid-
able in production of private goods. Then, the emitted public bads are accu-
mulated through every generation’s economic activity, and the accumulated
public bads stay in the stratosphere or under the ground over a long period
of time. Thus, the current emission of public bads by the current generation
may eﬀect the living conditions of succeeding generations rather than itself.
A typical example of such public bads is the green house gases (primarily
carbon dioxide) in global warming.
Given this kind of technological structure, intergenerational resource allo-
cations are discussed. There are possibly inﬁnite streams of population, and
each individual represents one generation. We assume that each generation
exists on the earth in one particular period of time, and there is no structure
of overlapping generations. Each generation represented by an individual
engages in economic activity. So, he produces some private good by utilizing
his labor as well as emitting a public bad. Moreover, he not only enjoys con-
sumption of his leisure hours and the private good produced by himself, but
also should be confronted with the negative eﬀect of the accumulated public
bads emitted by his ancestor generations. However, he is not aﬀected by
the current emission of the public bad which he produces. He can also invest
some amount of the produced private good for education, which improves the
technological knowledge of production utilized in the ages of his descendent
generations.1
Thus, each temporary allocation by each generation consists of his con-
sumption vector (a proﬁle of his working hours, his consumption of private
goods, and the accumulation of public bads confronted by him), his emission
of public bads, and his investment of the private good for education. Then,
an intergenerationally feasible allocation is deﬁned by a historical sequence
of each generation’s temporary allocation, which is dynamically consistent
with the technological condition of production.
Our concern in this model is to examine the existence of allocation rules,
which satisfy the three basic normative criteria, each of which is economic
eﬃciency, intergenerational equity,a n denvironmental sustainability respec-
1Asheim, Buchholz, and Tunggodden (2001) and Asheim and Buchholz (2005) con-
sidered a similar type of intergenerational resource allocations to ours, although they
discussed bequest of the natural resources, which is characterized as positive externality
rather than negative externality. Also, their economic models are much simpler than ours:
they do not have the component of educational investment that our model has.
2tively.2 Economic eﬃciency is represented by the axiom of Pareto eﬃciency.
In our model, every generation’s preference is deﬁn e do n l yo nh i so w nc o n -
sumption space, so there is no altruistic aspect in each generation’s rational
choice behavior. So, the deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency is a standard one ex-
cept that the set of social alternatives is given by that of intergenerational
allocations which is an inﬁnite dimensional space. The criterion of environ-
mental sustainability concerns improving the natural environment or leaving
it as close to its initial condition as possible for the future generations.
As the axioms of intergenerational equity, we start from introducing the
two traditional notions of equity: equity as no-envy (Foley (1967)) and egal-
itarian equivalence (Pazner and Schemeidler (1978)). Moreover, as weaker
variants of the no-envy axiom, we deﬁne the axioms of responsibility and
compensation, which were originally discussed and deﬁned by Dworkin (1981)
and Fleurbaey (1994, 1995) in the context of intragenerational resource al-
locations. Motivated by Suzumura and Tadenuma (2005), our axioms of
responsibility and compensation represent the value judgements such that
“Any generations should be equally responsible for their descendent gener-
ations’ living environments” and “The generation who is more handicapped
in his living environment should be compensated, being permitted to exploit
the natural environment more intensively.” Both of them seem to be rea-
sonable requirements in the context of intergenerational resource allocations
with long-run negative externality.
It would be desirable to have an allocation rule satisfying the axioms,
each of which respectively represents one of the above three basic normative
criteria. Unfortunately, our answer to this question is essentially negative:
Almost all of our main theorems discuss incompatibility between Pareto ef-
ﬁciency and any one of the axioms of intergenerational equity as well as the
axiom of environmental sustainability.
In the following discussion, section 2 provides the basic model of this pa-
per. Section 3 introduces the basic axioms of allocation rules in this economic
model. Section 4 characterizes Pareto eﬃcient allocations in this economic
model, and section 5 discusses the main theorems in this paper. Finally,
2Asheim et. al (2001), Asheim and Buchholz (2005), and Roemer (2005) also discuss
intergenerational equity and sustainability in production economies with externality, non-
overlapping generation, and non-utility discounting. As intergenerational equity criteria,
Asheim et. al (2001) and Asheim and Buchholz (2005) discuss the Suppes-Sen grading
principle and Roemer (2005) takes the ‘maximin welfare’ principle, while this paper starts
from discussing the no-envy and the egalitarian equivalence principles.
3section 6 gives us a short concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
There is an inﬁnite sequence of periods, T = {1,2,...,t,...} with generic
element t. Consider an economy at period t with one generation. To simplify
the argument, we assume that every generation can live only in one period.
Also, to focus on the intergenerational resource allocations, each generation
is represented by one individual. Thus, the period t also implies “generation
t.”
T h e r ei sa( p r i v a t e )g o o dy ∈ R+ which is produced from the labor
input l ∈ R+. The production process also involves emission of one public
bad z ∈ R+. Thus, the production technology is represented by a function
f : R2
+ → R+ which is deﬁned as: for any labor input l ∈ R+ and any
public bad emissions z ∈ R+, f (l,z)=y. This function is assumed to be
continuous, strictly increasing, concave, and f(0,z)=0& f(l,0) = 0 for any
z ∈ R+ and any l ∈ R+.
We impose an additional assumption on the technological progress in the
production process. The function f is rewritten as: there exists a continuous,
strictly increasing, and concave function g : R2
+ → R+ and a positive number
h ∈ R++ such that for any l ∈ R+ and any z ∈ R+, f (l,z)=g(h · l,z).N o t e
that the number h indicates a level of technological knowledge or “human cap-
ital.” We consider that the value h is valuable in each generation. Thus, the
production technology at generation t is denoted by: ft (l,z)=g(ht · l,z).
The value ht is determined by the combination of the knowledge ht−1 for any
t ∈ T\{1}, which is accumulated from 1-st generation to (t − 1)-th genera-
tion, and the investment for education wt−1 ∈ R+ by the generation t−1.F o r
t =1 , h1 = h0 ∈ R++,w h e r eh0 is the level of human capital given at the age
of pre-history. Thus, there is an increasing and continuous function H such
that ht = H (ht−1,w t−1) for any t ∈ T\{1}. The investment wt−1 is ﬁnanced
from the private good produced by the generation t − 1. Suppose in the fol-
lowing discussion, that there is an upper bound z of the public bad emission.
Also, suppose that ht = ht−1 = H (ht−1,0) for any t ∈ T\{1}. Sometimes,
we will discuss the case that H is constant. Note that the function H is
constant if for any h ∈ R++ and any w ∈ R+, h = H (h,w).





× R+ × R+,w h e r e0 < l<+∞ is the common upper bound of
4labor-leisure time, with the following generic formulas of consumption vector:
xt =( lt,yt,Zt−1).T h eﬁrst two components of the vector xt indicates that
the person in the generation t supplies lt amount of labor hour, and consumes
yt amount of private good produced at period t, which is actually a standard
argument. In contrast, the last component needs additional explanation:
Zt−1 indicates the accumulated amount of public bads emitted at each period
from 1 ∈ T until t−1 ∈ T.T h a ti s ,i fzt0 is the amount of public bads emitted
by the generation t0 =1 ,...,t−1, then the consumption level of public bads











where δ ∈ (0,1) is the natural rate of depletion at each period, and Z0 is the
initial endowment of public bads which was provided in the age of pre-history.
Note that every generation t does not suﬀer from the current emission of the
public bad zt.H e s u ﬀers from the accumulated amount of the public bad
emitted by his ancestors up to the previous generation. This is actually the
stylized fact of public bads consumption such as the issue of Global Warming.
Each and every generation t ∈ T is characterized by his preference re-
lation Rt on X. This relation is complete and transitive on X.F o r a n y
xt,e xt ∈ X, (xt,e xt) ∈ Rt means that xt is at least as good as e xt according
to t0s preference. P (Rt) and I (Rt) denote, respectively, the strict preference
relation and the indiﬀerence relation corresponding to Rt,v i z . ,(xt,e xt) ∈
P (Rt) if and only if [(xt,e xt) ∈ Rt &( e xt,x t) / ∈ Rt],a n d(xt,e xt) ∈ I (Rt) if
and only if [(xt,e xt) ∈ Rt &( e xt,x t) ∈ Rt].A l s o ,Rt is assumed to be strictly
monotonic (decreasing in labor time and public bad, and increasing in the




× R++ × R+,3 continuous and convex on X.T h e
universal class of such preference relations is denoted by R.
Given a stock of the public bad Zt−1, an accumulated knowledge ht−1,a n d
an investment wt−1,ap a i rat =( xt,zt,w t) ∈ X × R+ × R+ is a temporarily
feasible allocation for generation t in (Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) if xt =( lt,y t,Zt−1),
ht = H (ht−1,w t−1),a n dg(ht · lt,zt) ≥ yt + wt. The set of temporar-
ily feasible allocations for generation t in (Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) is denoted by
At(Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1).
3In what follows, R+, Rn
+ and Rn
++ denote, respectively, the set of non-negative real
numbers, the non-negative orthant and the positive orthant in the Euclidean n-space.
5Given an initial stock of the public bad Z0 and an initial endowment
of human capital h0, a historical sequence a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈
(X × R+ × R+)
∞ is an (intergenerationally) feasible allocation in (Z0,h 0) if




δ(t−1)−t0·zt0,a n dat is the temporarily feasible allocation
for generation t in (Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) at the period t, and the component of
t h ep u b l i cb a dc o n s u m p t i o no fxt is Zt−1. Fixing (Z0,h 0) in the following
discussion, the set of feasible allocations is denoted by A.
Let us deﬁne an economy by a historical sequence of all generations’
preferences RT =( Rt)t∈T ∈ R∞.A n allocation rule is a correspondence
ϕ : R∞ ³ A which associates to each RT ∈ R∞, a non-empty subset ϕ(RT)
of A.
3 Basic Axioms for Allocation Rules
In this section, we will introduce basic axioms, each of which should represent
an indispensable value in the problem of intergenerational resource alloca-
tions under economies with the long-run inﬂuence of negative externality.
Those axioms are categorized into the three normative viewpoints: economic
eﬃciency, intergenerational equity,a n denvironmental sustainability.
3.1 Axioms of Economic Eﬃciency
First, we discuss axioms of economic eﬃciency. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞,
for each t ∈ T and each (Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1), a temporarily feasible allocation
at =( xt,zt,w t) ∈ At(Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) for generation t is temporary Pareto
eﬃcient at RT if there is no temporarily feasible allocation e at =( e xt,e zt, e wt) ∈
At(Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) for generation t such that (e xt,x t) ∈ P (Rt).G i v e n a n
economy RT ∈ R∞, a feasible allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A
is Pareto eﬃcient at RT i ft h e r ei sn of e a s i b l ea l l o c a t i o ne a =( e at)t∈T =
(e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A such that for any t ∈ T, (e xt,x t) ∈ Rt holds, and there
exists t ∈ T such that (e xt,x t) ∈ P (Rt).
Now, we are ready to introduce a well-known axiom on allocation rules:
Pareto Eﬃciency (PE): For all RT ∈ R∞ and a ∈ ϕ(RT), a is Pareto
eﬃcient at RT.
6Given an economy RT ∈ R∞,f o re a c ht ∈ T and each (Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1),
a temporarily feasible allocation at =( xt,zt,w t) ∈ At(Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) for
generation t is temporarily selﬁsh if (zt,w t)=( z,0) and there is no other
e at =( e xt,z,0) ∈ At(Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) such that (e xt,x t) ∈ P (Rt).G i v e n a n
economy RT ∈ R∞, a feasible allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A is
selﬁsh if for each t ∈ T, (zt,w t)=( z,0) and there is no other e at =( e xt,z,0) ∈
At(Zt−1,h t−1,0) such that (e xt,x t) ∈ P (Rt).
Lemma 1: G i v e na ne c o n o m yRT ∈ R∞,aselﬁsh allocation a =( at)t∈T =
(xt,z,0)t∈T ∈ A is Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
Proof. Consider t =1 . Clearly, there is no other temporarily feasible
allocation e a1 =( e x1,e z1, e w1) ∈ A1(Z0,h 0,0) such that (e x1,x 1) ∈ P (R1). Sup-
pose e a1 ∈ A1(Z0,h 0,0) such that (e x1,x 1) ∈ I (R1).S i n c ez1 = z, it should
be e z1 = z. Then, any feasible allocation e a ∈ A with e a1 at the 1-st pe-
riod should be unable to have e a2 =( e x2,e z2, e w2) ∈ A2(Z0,h 0,0) such that
(e x2,x 2) ∈ P (R2). By repeating this procedure inﬁnitely, we can see that
there is no other feasible allocation which Pareto-dominates a.
Although PE is a fundamental requirement of economic eﬃciency, Lemma
1 indicates that the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations contains selﬁsh alloca-
tions in this model. Note that implementation of selﬁsh allocations cannot
resolve the issue of negative externality. In particular, if the negative ex-
ternality by the emissions of public bads leads the society to the crisis of
human’s sustainability, the implementation of selﬁsh allocations indicates an
undesirable situation. Thus, we would like to require:
Non-Selﬁsh Pareto Eﬃciency (NSPE): For all RT ∈ R∞ and a ∈
ϕ(RT), a is non-selﬁsh Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
Thus, the axiom NSPE requires not only eﬃcient allocations of resources
among generations, but also implementation of some policies for regulating
the public bads emissions and of educational investments for future genera-
tions.
We will also discuss a second best notion of eﬃciency. This notion re-
quires a constrained eﬃcient allocation of resources by some policies of reg-
ulation and investment. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞,f o re a c ht ∈ T and
each (Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1), a temporarily feasible allocation at =( xt,zt,w t) ∈
At(Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) for generation t is (zt,w t)-constrained temporary Pareto
7eﬃcient at RT if there is no temporarily feasible allocation e at =( e xt,e zt, e wt) ∈
At(Zt−1,h t−1,w t−1) for generation t such that (e zt, e wt)=( zt,w t) and (e xt,x t) ∈
P (Rt). It is clear that if a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A is Pareto eﬃcient
at RT,t h e nf o ra n yt ∈ T, at =( xt,zt,w t) is (zt,w t)-constrained temporary
Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
Given a feasible allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A, (zt,w t)t∈T is
a feasible sequence of public bads provisions and investments for new tech-
nological knowledge. Given such a feasible sequence (zt,w t)t∈T,l e te a =
(e at)t∈T =( e xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A be another feasible allocation whose compo-
nents of public bads and investments are (zt,w t)t∈T. Let us denote the
set of such feasible allocations by A(zt,w t)t∈T when the feasible sequence
(zt,w t)t∈T is given. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞, and given a feasible se-
quence (zt,w t)t∈T, a feasible allocation a∗ =( a∗t)t∈T =( x∗t,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A is
(zt,w t)t∈T-constrained Pareto eﬃcient at RT if there is no other feasible al-
location e a =( e at)t∈T =( e xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A(zt,w t)t∈T such that for any t ∈ T,




Note that for any feasible allocation a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A,i ti s(zt,w t)t∈T-
constrained Pareto eﬃcient at RT if and only if for any t ∈ T, at =( xt,zt,w t)
is (zt,w t)-constrained temporary Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
3.2 Axioms on Intergenerational Equity
Here we discuss axioms of intergenerational equity. At the ﬁrst place, the
following axiom is relevant to equity in terms of subjective well-being. This
is an extension of the no-envy principle (Foley (1967)) to the problem of
intergenerational resource allocations:
No-Envy (NE): For all RT ∈ R∞ and a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), we have
that: for any t ∈ T,
¡
xt,x t0¢
∈ Rt holds for any t0 ∈ T.
The following ﬁve axioms are weaker versions of the no-envy axiom:
Equal Welfare for Equal Preferences (EWEP): For all RT ∈ R∞ and
a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), we have that: for any t,t0 ∈ T,i fRt = Rt0,







xt =( lt,0,Zt−1),a n d
¡
xt0,x t¢




Equal Welfare for Uniform Preferences (EWUP): For all RT ∈ R∞
and a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), we have that: if for any t,t0 ∈ T, Rt = Rt0,
8then for any t,t0 ∈ T,o n eo ft h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e eh o l d s :
¡
xt,x t0¢
∈ I (Rt), ¡
xt,x t0¢
∈ Rt for xt =( lt,0,Zt−1),a n d
¡
xt0,x t¢




The above two axioms are originated from Fleurbaey (1994, 1995), which dis-
cussed intragenerational resource allocations under pure exchange economies.
These are axioms of compensation for “more handicapped generations.” Note,
here the “more handicapped generations” means the generations endowed
with more amount of accumulated public bads and/or less accumulation of
human capital.
It is easy to see that EWUP is a weaker variant of EWEP. The next
axiom is another weaker variant of EWEP:
Undomination among Equal Preferences (UNEP): For all RT ∈ R∞
and a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), we have that: for any t,t0 ∈ T,i f Rt = Rt0,





zt <z t0 or wt >w t0¤
.4
This axioms says that the “more handicapped generation” has a right to
produce and utilize more resources for only his own consumption.
T h en e x tt h r e ea x i o m sa r eo fresponsibility axioms. The ﬁrst two are
a variation of the “No-envy among equal skills,” which was originally dis-
cussed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) in the context of intragenerational
resource allocations under production economies:
No-Envy among Equal-Endowed Generations (NEEG): For all RT ∈
R∞ and a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), we have that: for any t,t0 ∈ T,i f
Zt−1 = Zt0−1 and ht = ht0,w h e r eZt−1 (resp. Zt0−1) is the third component of








No-Envy among Uniform-Endowed Generations (NEUG): For all
RT ∈ R∞ and a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), we have that: if for any t,t0 ∈ T,
Zt−1 = Zt0−1 and ht = ht0,w h e r eZt−1 (resp. Zt0−1)i st h et h i r dc o m p o n e n t








The third axiom of responsibility is introduced as follows:
4Note that the vector inequalities are deﬁned as follows: for any a,b ∈ Rq with q>1,
a ≥ b if and only if ai ≥ bi for all i =1 ,2,...,q; a > b if and only if a ≥ b and ai >b i
for some i =1 ,2,...,q;a n da À b if and only if a ≥ b and ai >b i for all i =1 ,2,...,q.
9Responsibility for Future Generations (RFG): For all RT ∈ R∞ and
a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), we have that: for any t,t0 ∈ T,i fZt−1 =
Zt0−1 and ht = ht0,w h e r eZt−1 (resp. Zt0−1) is the third component of the







This axiom requires responsibility of the current generation to keep the “liv-
ing environment” as well as possible for future generations. Note that NEEG
implies RFG.
Although the above axioms are of equity as no-envy and its weaker vari-
ations, we can also discuss a variation of the egalitarian-equivalent principle
(Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)) in this problem of intergenerational resource
allocations. When we discuss the egalitarian-equivalence axiom here, let us
assume that (1 − δ)Z0 ≤ z.L e tz∗ ≤ z be a social reference level of public
bads emission. Then, let us deﬁne (Z0,h 0,z∗) as a social reference level of
“natural environments.” Given any generation t ∈ T with his preference
Rt,l e txt (Rt;Z0,h 0,z∗) be t’s ideal consumption vector which is maximal
w.r.t. Rt whenever he is faced with production condition g(h0l,z∗) and the
stock of public bads Z0. Now, we are ready to discuss a variation of the
egalitarian-equivalent principle in this context:
z∗-Egalitarian Equivalence (z∗-EE): For all RT ∈ R∞ and a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈
ϕ(RT), we have that: for any t ∈ T, (xt,x t (Rt;Z0,h 0,z∗)) ∈ I (Rt) holds.
This axiom is a requirement of equal opportunity for welfare among gen-
erations. In particular, if z∗ is given by z∗ =( 1 − δ)Z0,t h e nt h es o c i a l
reference proﬁle (Z0,h 0,z∗) indicates that every generation is guaranteed
an initial natural environment (Z0,h 0) by his preceding generations, and he
also guarantees this environment for his descendant generation by restricting
the public bads emission to z∗.T h u s , t h e a x i o m z∗-EE guarantees every
generation equally the welfare level which is maximal under the constraint
(Z0,h 0,z∗).
3.3 Axioms of Environmental Sustainability
We can also consider other axioms to judge the wellness of intergenerational
resource allocations, which are relevant to sustainability. By sustainability,
we may consider at least two meanings in the environmental literature. One
is of the ‘natural environmentalist’ who insists the intrinsic value of natural
10environments, where such a value is not necessarily relevant to the welfare of
human beings. So, sustainability should mean for the ‘natural environmen-
talist,’ that the historical sequence of stocks of public bads is non-increasing
in T.
As the axiom of sustainability for the ‘natural environmentalist,’ we deﬁne
the followings:
Public Bads Monotonicity (PBM): For all RT ∈ R∞ and a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T =
((lt,yt,Zt−1),zt,w t)t∈T ∈ ϕ(RT), it holds that Zt0−1 ≥ Zt00−1 whenever t0 ≤
t00.
This axiom is well-deﬁned. Take a historical sequence of public bad provision
z =( zt)t∈T such that z1 ≤ (1 − δ) · Z0, and for any other t ∈ T\{1}, zt =
(1 − δ)·[δZ0 + z1]. Then, the emission of z1 is compatible with temporarily
feasible allocations, and for any t ∈ T, Zt−1 = Z1 = δZ0 + z1 ≤ Z0 holds.
These facts imply that it is possible to construct an allocation rule which
satisﬁes the axiom PBM.
The other meaning is from the standpoint of ‘humanist.’ So, sustain-
ability means for the ‘humanist,’ that the historical sequence of human’s
welfare is non-increasing in T.5 In this approach, an important issue is how
to measure human’s welfare. Since each generation’s preference is ordinally
measurable and intergenerationally noncomparable in this model, we cannot
use it as for measuring each generation’s welfare: the requisite of the non-
increasing of human’s welfare over periods implicitly assumes the existence
of intergenerationally comparable welfare units.
In this paper, we assume the existence of an objective welfare measure.
A typical example of such a measure can be found in the theory of function-
ings and capability developed by Sen (1980; 1985): the welfare measure is a
representation of some ordering relation deﬁned over alternative capabilities
that human beings can enjoy. This is formulated by an ordering J deﬁned
over X × R+,w h e r et h i sR+ is the space for human capital. Thus, for any
(x,h),(x0,h 0) ∈ X × R+, ((x,h),(x0,h 0)) ∈ J implies that having the con-
sumption vector x and the knowledge h i sa tl e a s ta sd e s i r a b l ef o rh u m a n
beings as having the consumption vector x0 and the knowledge h0. Then:
J-Reference Human Development (J-HD): For all RT ∈ R∞ and a =
5Asheim et. al (2001), Asheim and Buchholz (2005), and Roemer (2005) adopted this
approach for deﬁning sustainability. See also Silvestre (2002; 2005).







J whenever t0 ≤ t00.
Note that the meaning of human development is based upon the property
of the ordering J. In the following discussion, we naturally assume that J is
continuous and strictly monotonic in X ×R+ (decreasing in labor hours and
public bads, and increasing in the share of output and level of knowledge),
and convex on X×{h} for any h ∈ R+. Thus, for every generation, inherited
a higher level of knowledge and a lower level of the stock of public bads can
enhance his objective welfare, while bequeathing a lower level of educational
investment and a higher level of public bads emission can make his descendent
generations worse oﬀ in terms of the objective welfare measure J.
4 Characterizations of Intergenerational Pareto
Eﬃciency
Before examining the possibility of allocation rules satisfying the axioms
relevant to economic eﬃciency, intergenerational equity, and sustainability,
we would like to characterize Pareto eﬃcient allocations in this model. At the
ﬁrst place, the following lemma gives us a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for Pareto eﬃciency.
Lemma 2: Given an economy RT ∈ R∞, a feasible allocation a =( at)t∈T =
(xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A is Pareto eﬃcient at RT if and only if the following con-
dition holds:
(?) For any t ∈ T and any e a =( e at)t∈T =( e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A with (xt,e xt) ∈




∈ P (Rt),t h e nt h e r ee x i s t st
0 ∈ T such that
t








This lemma is almost the deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency, so we will skip the
proof. We can also have the necessary and suﬃcient condition for Pareto
eﬃciency, in the speciﬁcc a s eo ft h ec o n s t a n tH.
Lemma 3: Assume H is constant. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞,af e a s i b l e
allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A is Pareto eﬃcient at RT if and
only if the following condition holds:
12(*) For any t ∈ T and any e a =( e at)t∈T =( e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A with (xt,zt,w t)=




∈ P (Rt),t h e nt h e r ee x i s t st
0 ∈ T such
that t








Proof. Let us examine if a is Pareto eﬃcient at RT,t h e na meets the
condition (*). Suppose a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A violates (*). Then, there exists
e a =( e at)t∈T =( e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A with some t ∈ T such that (xt,zt,w t)=




∈ P (Rt),a n d(e xt,x t) ∈ Rt for any t>t.
This implies a is Pareto-dominated by e a.
Consider the inverse relation. Suppose a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A is not
Pareto eﬃcient at RT. Then, there is a feasible allocation e a =( e at)t∈T =
(e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A which Pareto-dominates a at RT. Suppose there exists




∈ P (Rt),a n d
(e xt,x t) ∈ Rt for any t>t.
First, consider the case that for any t<t, (xt,zt,w t) is (zt,w t)-constrained
temporary Pareto eﬃcient at RT. Then, for t =1 , (e x1,e z1, e w1) 6=( x1,z1,w 1)
and (x1,e x1) ∈ I (R1) imply either w1 > 0 or e z1 >z 1.S i n c eH is constant, if
w1 > 0, then the new allocation b a ∈ A such that b a1 =( ( l1,y 1 + w1,Z0),zt,01)
and b at =( xt,zt,w t) for any t ∈ T\{1} has the property to violate the condi-
tion (*) for a at RT.I fe z1 >z 1,t h e n(x1,e x1) ∈ I (R1) implies that (e x1,e z1, e w1)
is not (e z1, e w1)-constrained temporary Pareto eﬃcient at RT.T h u s ,t h en e w
allocation b a ∈ A such that b a1 =( b x1,e z1, e w1),w h e r eb a1 is (e z1, e w1)-constrained
temporary Pareto eﬃcient at RT,a n db at =( e xt,e zt, e wt) for any t ∈ T\{1} has
the property to violate the condition (*) for a at RT.
If (e x1,e z1, e w1)=( x1,z1,w 1) and (e x2,e z2, e w2) 6=( x2,z2,w 2),t h e nb yas i m i -
lar discussion to that for (e x1,e z1, e w1) 6=( x1,z1,w 1) i nt h ep r e v i o u sp a r a g r a p h ,
we can construct a new allocation b a ∈ A which Pareto-dominates a at RT
such that b a1 =( x1,z1,w 1) and b a2 with (b x2,x 2) ∈ P (R2).T h i s b a ∈ A has
the property to violate the condition (*) for a at RT.I ns u c haw a y ,w ec a n
show that if (xt,e xt) ∈ I (Rt) holds for any t<t,t h e n(xt,zt,w t)=( e xt,e zt, e wt)
holds for any t<t. In this case, e a is the desired allocation which has the
property to violate the condition (*) for a at RT.







-constrained temporary Pareto eﬃcient at RT. Then, it is easy to
construct an alternative allocation b a ∈ A such that
¡





constrained temporary Pareto eﬃcient at RT,a n d(b xt,b zt, b wt)=( xt,zt,w t)
13holds for any other t 6= t0. Then, this allocation b a violates the condition (*)
for a at RT.
Let a feasible allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A be called a
no-investment allocation if for any t ∈ T, wt =0 .
Lemma 4: Assume H is constant. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞,l e taf e a -
sible allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,0)t∈T ∈ A be a no-investment allocation.
Suppose for this allocation, there is any integer k>0 such that
(1) zt < z for any t<k ;
(2) zt < z for any t ∈ T such that there exists a positive integer n>0 with
nk < t < (n +1 )k;a n d
(3) zt = z for any t = nk and for any positive integer n =1 ,2,...,.
Moreover, for any t ∈ T, at is (zt,0)-constrained temporary Pareto eﬃcient
at RT. Then, a is Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an alternative allocation e a =( e at)t∈T =
(e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A and a generation t ∈ T such that (xt,zt,w t)=( e xt,e zt, e wt)




∈ P (Rt). Then, by deﬁnition of a, e zt >z t
and e wt =0 . Note that there exists a positive integer n>0 such that
(n − 1)k<t<n k . Then, znk = z. Suppose that for any t ∈ T with
t<t<n k , (e xt,x t) ∈ Rt. Then, e zt+1 >z t+1 and e wt+1 =0 ,s i n c ee Zt >Z t.
Thus, to keep (e xt,x t) ∈ Rt for t = t+2, it follows e zt+2 >z t+2 and e wt+2 =0 ,
since e Zt+1 >Z t+1. In a similar way, e zt >z t and e wt =0for any t ∈ T with




By Lemma 3, a is Pareto eﬃcient.
The next lemma shows that if every generation is assigned a temporarily
non-selﬁsh allocation, such a feasible allocation cannot be Pareto eﬃcient.
Lemma 5: G i v e na ne c o n o m yRT ∈ R∞, let a feasible allocation a =
(at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A be (zt,w t)t∈T-constrained Pareto eﬃcient at RT
such that zt < z for any t ∈ T.T h e n ,a is not Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
Proof. Suppose that Rt is representable by a continuous real-valued function
ut. Consider an alternative allocation e a =( e at)t∈T =( e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A,w h i c h
is (e zt, e wt)t∈T-constrained Pareto eﬃcient at RT and is deﬁned as follows:
(1) e wt = wt for any t ∈ T;
14(2) e zt = zt + 4zt for t =1 ,w h e r e4zt > 0 is small enough;
























































where 4Zt−1 = e Zt−1−Zt−1 > 0.W ec a nﬁnd an appropriate (4zt)t∈T which
guarantees zt + 4zt ≤ z for any t ∈ T.
Let us show this. Given any small enough 4z1 > 0,l e t4z
T (4z1) ∈ R∞
++
be a vector (4zt)t∈T satisfying the above (2) and (3) with 4z1 as its ﬁrst
component, such that for any other (4b zt)t∈T satisfying (2) and (3) with
4b z1 = 4z1, 4zt ≤ 4b zt holds for any t ∈ T.B y t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f ut
and g, the existence of such 4z
T (4z1) is guaranteed for any small enough
4z1 > 0. Note that each component of the vector 4z
T (4z1) increases when
4z1 increases. The mapping 4z
T is also continuous at every small enough
4z1.6
Suppose for some 4b z1 > 0, 4z
T (4b z1) has a subset N of T such that for
any t ∈ N, t has 4zt (4b z1) > z− zt in this vector, where 4zt (4b z1) means
the t-th component of the vector 4z
T (4b z1). However, since 4z
T (4z1) →
0 ∈ R∞
+ as 4z1 → 0,w eﬁnd an appropriately small enough 4z∗1 > 0 such
that for any t ∈ T, 4zt (4z∗1) ≤ z− zt by the increasing and continuous
property of the mapping 4z
T.
By construction, (e x1,x 1) ∈ P (R1).M o r e o v e r , (e xt,x t) ∈ Rt for any t ∈
T\{1}.T h i si m p l i e se a Pareto dominates a.
Lemma 5 d e s e r v e ss o m ec o m m e n t .I ts h o w st h a ti fg e n e r a t i o n sf a i lt oe m i t
to the maximal public bads, then a Pareto improving allocation can be con-
structed by increasing the sequence of public bads {e zt}t∈T in such a way that
each generation compensates the increased inherited public bads, in turn by
appropriately increasing the amount of public bads bequeathed. This type
of situation would not work in a ﬁnite-horizon economy.
Throughout the above arguments on Pareto eﬃciency in this intergener-
ational resource allocations, we can summarize as in the following:
Proposition 1: Given an economy RT ∈ R∞, let a feasible allocation a =
(at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A be (zt,w t)t∈T-constrained Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
6To deﬁne the continuity of the mapping 4z
T, we may adopt the sup metric as the
topology of R∞
+ .
15Then, a is Pareto eﬃcient at RT only if for any t ∈ T, [zt < z ] implies £
∃t0 ∈ T s.t. t0 >t , zt0 = z and wt0 =0
¤
.
Proof. Suppose that there exists t ∈ T such that zt = z holds, and for any
t0 ∈ T with t0 > t, zt0 < z or wt0 > 0 holds. Then, consider another feasible
allocation e a =( e at)t∈T =( e xt,e zt, e wt)t∈T ∈ A,w h i c hi s(e zt, e wt)t∈T-constrained
Pareto eﬃcient at RT and is deﬁned as follows:
(1) for any t<t, e at = at;
(2) for t = t, e zt = zt + 4zt & e wt = wt,w h e r e4zt > 0 is small enough;




with t>t, either (i) e zt = zt + 4zt & e wt = wt, or (ii)



























































where e Zt−1 = Zt−1 + 4Zt−1 for 4Zt−1 =
Pt−1









= ht+1,a n de ht = H
³
e ht−1, e wt−1
´





with t>t. Through an argument similar to that in the proof









∈ P (Rt+1).M o r e -




with t>t.T h i si m p l i e se a Pareto
dominates a.
Thus, Proposition 1 shows that every Pareto eﬃcient allocation needs an
inﬁnite subset of generations who enjoy a “selﬁsh” consumptions. Otherwise,
there exists a Pareto improving allocation with an increased sequence of
public bads emissions as discussed in the comment for Lemma 5.
Proposition 2: Assume H is constant. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞,l e ta
feasible allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,0t)t∈T ∈ A be (zt,0t)t∈T-constrained
Pareto eﬃcient at RT.T h e n ,a is Pareto eﬃcient at RT if and only if the
following condition holds:
(∗) For any t ∈ T, [zt < z ] implies
£
∃t0 ∈ T s.t. t0 >t , zt0 = z and wt0 =0
¤
.
Proof. Suppose that for any t ∈ T, [zt < z ] implies
h
∃t
0 ∈ T s.t. t
0 >t , z
t0





16Suppose that there exists an alternative allocation e a =( e at)t∈T =( e xt,e zt,0t)t∈T ∈





∈ P (Rt). Then, by deﬁnition of a, e zt >z t.N o t et h e r ee x i s t s
t0 ∈ T such that t0 > t, zt0 = z and wt0 =0 . Then, following the proof of
Lemma 4, we can see that if (e xt,x t) ∈ Rt for any t ∈ T with t<t<t 0,t h e n ¡
xt0,e xt0¢
∈ P (Rt0). Thus, by Lemma 3, a is Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
The above two characterization results indicate that any regulation policy
for the public bad emissions is incompatible with Pareto eﬃciency, whenever
it requires zt < z for any t ∈ T. However, it seems to be reasonable, from the
viewpoint of intergenerational equity, to require zt = zt0 < z for any t, t0 ∈ T.
Thus, Proposition 1 implies that such a requirement of intergenerational
equity is inconsistent with Pareto eﬃciency. To be Pareto eﬃcient, the fea-
sible allocation should have temporary selﬁsh allocations, as Proposition 2
shows for the case of constant H.
5M a i n T h e o r e m s
In this section, we argue the fundamental incompatibility between Pareto
eﬃciency and intergenerational equity. First, we will focus on the case
(1 − δ)Z0 ≤ z in the following discussion. This assumption is reasonable,
since the case (1 − δ)Z0 > z implies that even the maximal emissions of pub-
lic bads by all generations decrease the accumulated amount of public bads,
which is counterintuitive. Second, as an eﬃciency requirement, we think
NSPE is more reasonable than PE,s i n c ePE permits selﬁsh allocations. In
f a c t ,i ti sn o ts od e s i r a b l ee v e ni fPE and an intergenerational equity axiom
are compatible only at selﬁsh allocations, because such allocations do not
resolve the issue of negative externality.
Let us examine the compatibility between Pareto eﬃciency and intergen-
erational equity in terms of no-envy, given the above two reasonable restric-
tions. We arrive at the following fundamental impossibility theorem:
Theorem 1: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 ≤ z. Then, there is no allocation rule ϕ
which satisﬁes NSPE and NE.
Proof. Let us consider an economy RT ∈ R∞ such that for any t,t0 ∈ T,
Rt = Rt0. Moreover, in this economy RT, we will suppose that every gener-
17ation’s preference Rt is not so much sensitive to the change of accumulated
public bads.
Case 1: L e tu st a k ea n yP a r e t oe ﬃcient allocation a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A








6=( z,0) for the generation t +1∈ T. The existence of the
generation t is guaranteed by Lemma 5 and Proposition 1.C o n s i d e rZt−1
and Zt in this allocation. Note that Zt−1 is consumed by the generation t as
the third component of the vector xt, while Zt is consumed by the generation
t +1as the third component of the vector xt+1.C o n s i d e r
Z
t − Z
t−1 = −(1 − δ) · Z
t−1 + z.
We will show Zt − Zt−1 > 0.C o m p a r eZt−1 with z



















































z − (1 − δ)Z
0¤
≥ 0
by the assumption. Thus, z





This implies Zt−Zt−1 = −(1 − δ)·Zt−1+z ≥−(1 − δ)· z
1−δ +z =0 .T h u s ,













P (Rt+1),s i n c ext is temporarily selﬁsh.
Case 2: L e tu st a k ea n yP a r e t oe ﬃcient allocation a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A





18(zt,w t)=( z,0) for any t ∈ T with t>t. In this case, compare xt with xt+1.





6=( z,0),s i n c ea is non-selﬁsh. In particular, if zt−1 < z,




∈ P (Rt+1),s i n c ext is temporarily selﬁsh.




6=( z,0), wt−1 > 0.
Note it may be the case that Zt−1 ≥ Zt−2. However, in this economy RT,
every generation is not so much sensitive to the change of accumulated public





∈ P (Rt−1),s i n c ext is temporarily selﬁsh.
In summary, if a Pareto eﬃcient allocation is non-selﬁsh, then it does not
meet the no-envy condition. Thus, there is no allocation rule satisﬁes NSPE
and NE.
The above theorem implies that any policy for regulating the emissions of
public bads and promoting education for human capital is Pareto ineﬃcient
whenever it cares about intergenerational equity in terms of no-envy. How-
ever, if we give up any of such policy, is it possible to implement eﬃcient and
equitable allocations in this model? The answer is still negative in general,
as the following theorem suggests:
Theorem 2: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 ≤ z. Then, there exists an allocation rule
ϕ which satisﬁes selﬁsh-PE and NE if and only if (1 − δ)Z0 = z.
Proof. Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 = z. Then, a historical sequence (z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T
with (z∗t,w ∗t)=( z,0) for any t ∈ T constitutes a feasible sequence of emitted
public bads and investments for human capital, and it holds that Zt−1 = Z0
for any t ∈ T. Given any economy RT and this sequence (z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T,l e t
us consider a feasible allocation a∗ =( x∗t,z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T as follows: for any
t ∈ T, the third component of x∗t is given by Z0;a n dt h eﬁr s ta n dt h es e c o n d
components (l∗t,y ∗t) of x∗t are given by: ((l∗t,y ∗t,Z0),(lt,yt,Z0)) ∈ Rt where
(lt,y t) satisﬁes g(h0 · lt,z) ≥ yt. Thus, the allocation a∗ is selﬁsh, so that
it is Pareto eﬃcient by Lemma 1. Moreover, since in this allocation, every
generation chooses his selﬁsh action under the same components of the public
bads accumulation Z0 and the human capital accumulation h0.T h u s ,a∗ is
no-envy.
Consider (1 − δ)Z0 < z. Then, in the selﬁsh sequence of emitted pubic
bads and investments for human capital (z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T, Zt−1 >Z 0 holds for
19any t ∈ T\{1}. Consider an economy R0T ∈ R∞ such that for any t,t0 ∈ T,
R0
t = R0
t0. Consider any selﬁsh allocation a0 =( x0t,z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T which is
consistent with (z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T in this economy R0T. Then, every generation
t ∈ T\{1} except the generation 1 in this selﬁsh allocation strictly prefers
x01 to x0t under the economy R0T.
Consider (1 − δ)Z0 > z. Then, in the selﬁsh sequence of emitted public
bads and investments for human capital (z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T, Zt−1 <Z 0 holds for
any t ∈ T\{1}.C o n s i d e ra ne c o n o m yR00T ∈ R∞ such that for any t,t0 ∈ T,
R00
t = R00
t0. Consider any selﬁsh allocation a00 =( x00t,z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T which is
consistent with (z∗t,w ∗t)t∈T in this economy R00T. Then, (x0t,x 01) ∈ P (R1)
holds for any generation t ∈ T\{1}.
The implication of the above theorem is incompatibility between Pareto
eﬃciency and intergenerational equity in terms of no-envy even over selﬁsh
allocations. This is because selﬁsh allocations can be no-envy if and only if
(1 − δ)Z0 = z, but the occurrence of this equation is almost improbable. In
fact, the most probable setting is (1 − δ)Z0 < z, which implies the situation
that the negative externality to the future generation becomes more serious
whenever the current generation emits the maximal amount of public bads.
If the no-envy axiom is replaced by the responsibility and compensation
axioms, is it possible to have a better result? Unfortunately, the following
theorem gives us a negative answer:
Theorem 3: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 ≤ z. Then, there is no allocation rule ϕ
which satisﬁes NSPE and EWUP.
Proof. Let us consider an economy RT ∈ R∞ such that for any t,t0 ∈ T,
Rt = Rt0. Moreover, in this economy RT, we suppose the following type of
preference:
(i) every generation’s preference Rt is not so much sensitive to the change of
accumulated public bads;
(ii) every generation’s preference Rt meets the boundary condition in the
sense that for any (lt,Zt),
³










e lt,0, e Zt
´´
∈ P (Rt) holds.
Thus, in this economy RT, any feasible allocation a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A




In other words, EWUP is equivalent to NE at RT. Thus, following the proof
20of Theorem 1,w ec a ns e et h a te v e r yn o n - s e l ﬁsh Pareto eﬃcient allocation
at RT has a pair of generations t,t0 ∈ T such that
¡
xt,x t0¢
∈ P (Rt0),w h i c h
indicates the violation of EWUP.
Corollary 1: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 ≤ z. Then, there is no allocation rule ϕ
which satisﬁes NSPE, EWUP,a n dRFG.
Proof. It is obvious from Theorem 3.
The above impossibility result in Corollary 1 comes from the inconsis-
tency of EWUP with NSPE. Thus, the axioms of responsibility and com-
pensation cannot constitute an eﬃcient allocation rule whenever EWUP is
taken as the weaker variant of the basic axiom of compensation. By the way,
if we take UNEP as another weaker axiom of the compensation principle,
is it possible to make an eﬃcient allocation rule satisfying the principles of
responsibility and compensation? The following theorem still gives us a nega-
tive answer whenever NEEG is required as the basic axiom of responsibility:
Theorem 4: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 < z and H is constant. Then, there is no
allocation rule ϕ which satisﬁes PE, UNEP, and NEEG.
Proof. Take any feasible allocation a =( at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A such
that there exists two generations t,t
0 ∈ T such that t<t
0 and Zt−1 = Zt
0−1.
Since we consider the case that H is constant, ht = ht
0
= h0. W. l.o.g., let
us suppose that (1 − δ)Zt−1 < z.L e tz∗ ≡ (1 − δ)Zt−1.
Consider the following economy RT ∈ R∞: for any t ∈ T such that t ≥ t,
his preference Rt is represented by the following utility function ut: for any ³






























0). Moreover, it follows that the generation t emits zt = z∗ in
the allocation a, which we will show now. Suppose zt >z ∗. Then, Zt >Z t−1.
Then, zt+1 >z t by UNEP.T h u s ,Zt+1 >Z t−1.S o ,zt+2 >z t by UNEP,
which implies Zt+2 >Z t−1. By repeating this process up to t
0 − 1,w e
conclude that Zt
0−1 >Z t−1, which is a contradiction. By applying the similar
21argument for the case of zt <z ∗, we can arrive at Zt
0−1 <Z t−1,w h i c hi sa l s o
a contradiction. Thus, zt = z∗ holds in the allocation a.
Note that to make a Pareto eﬃcient at RT,w eh a v et or e q u i r et h a t
each temporary allocation at is at least (zt,0t)-constrained temporary Pareto




















































∈ I (Rt)=I (Rt









constrained temporary Pareto eﬃcient at RT.S e c o n d ,i fzt
0





∈ I (Rt)=I (Rt
0),i tf o l l o w st h a tlt
0






























-constrained temporary Pareto eﬃcient at


























































for any e lt
0
≥ lt.T h i r d , i f zt
0




∈ P (Rt)=P (Rt
0)
holds. Thus, NEEG implies that zt
0
= zt.
The above argument implies that Zt
0−1 = Zt
0
, so that the property of
NEEG should be applied for the generations t
0 and t
0 +1 . Thus, following
t h ea b o v ea r g u m e n t ,w ea r r i v ea tzt
0+1 = zt
0
< z.I ns u c haw a y ,zt = zt
0
< z
holds for any t ∈ T with t>t
0,s i n c ea has the property of NEEG.B y
Proposition 1, a cannot be Pareto eﬃcient.
Let us also examine the compatibility between Pareto eﬃciency and in-
tergenerational equity in terms of egalitarian-equivalence. Unfortunately, the
following theorem gives us a negative answer:
Theorem 5: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 < z and let z∗ ≡ (1 − δ)Z0. Then, there
is no allocation rule ϕ which satisﬁes PE and z∗-EE.
22Proof. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞, let us take any feasible allocation a =
(at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A which is a z∗-egalitarian equivalent allocation.
Thus, for any t ∈ T and any at, there exists a corresponding ideal allocation
at
0 =( xt
0,z∗,0t) such that xt
0 ≡ (lt
0,g(h0lt
0,z∗),Z0) is the maximizer of Rt
under the constraint (Z0,h 0,z∗).S i n c ez∗ =( 1− δ)Z0, the allocation a0 =
(at
0)t∈T =( xt
0,z∗,0t)t∈T becomes a feasible allocation. Since z∗ < z,t h e
feasible allocation a0 ∈ A is (z∗,0)-constrained Pareto eﬃcient at RT,b u tn o t
Pareto eﬃcient at RT by Proposition 1. Thus, there exists an alternative
feasible allocation a0 ∈ A which Pareto-dominates a0. By the way, since a is
Pareto indiﬀerent to a0, a is Pareto-dominated by a0.
Finally, we can also obtain the incompatibility between Pareto eﬃciency
and environmental sustainability. The ﬁrst incompatibility relevent to PBM
is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 6: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 < z. Then, there is no allocation rule ϕ
which satisﬁes PE and PBM.
Proof. Given an economy RT ∈ R∞, let us take any feasible allocation a =
(at)t∈T =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A which has a monotone non-increasing sequence
of public bads consumptions (Zt−1)t∈T.S i n c e(1 − δ)Z0 < z,a n d(Zt−1)t∈T
is a monotone non-increasing sequence, zt < z holds for any t ∈ T. Thus, by
Proposition 1, a cannot be Pareto eﬃcient at RT.
The second incompatibility is relevent to J-HD.
Theorem 7: Suppose (1 − δ)Z0 < z. Then, there is no allocation rule ϕ
which satisﬁes NSPE and J-HD.
Proof. Let us consider an economy RT ∈ R∞ such that for any t,t0 ∈
T, Rt = Rt0. Moreover, in this economy RT,w ew i l ls u p p o s et h a te v e r y
generation’s preference Rt is consistent with J in the sense that for any
xt0,x t00 ∈ X, (x,x0) ∈ Rt holds if and only if there exists h ∈ R+ such that
((x,h),(x0,h)) ∈ J.
L e tu st a k ea n yP a r e t oe ﬃcient allocation a =( xt,zt,w t)t∈T ∈ A in





ht = ht+1. This case corresponds to either Case 1 or Case 2 in the proof of

























∈ J for this ht.C o n s i d e rZt−1 and Zt in this allocation
as in the proof of Theorem 1. Then, since (1 − δ)Z0 < z, z
1−δ >Z t−1 holds,
and so Zt − Zt−1 = −(1 − δ) · Zt−1 + z>−(1 − δ)· z
1−δ + z =0 .T h u s ,













since ht = ht+1 and xt is temporarily selﬁsh for Rt.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a
violates J-HD.
This theorem implies that non-selﬁsh Pareto eﬃciency leads to the viola-
tion of human development in terms of the objective welfare measure J.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The main theorems put forward in section 5 indicate that Pareto eﬃciency
is not so attractive in this context of resource allocations. In this model,
the more eﬃcient production of private goods by one generation involves the
more emission of the public bad, which this generation does not suﬀer from.
Thus, from the point of this generation’s rational choice, he has no motiva-
tion to regulate the emission of the public bad. However, from the point of
sustainability of human beings as well as the point of intergenerational eq-
uity, each generation should implement some policy for regulating the public
bad emissions. In contrast, Pareto eﬃciency requires that there should be
generations who never implement any policy for regulating the public bad
emissions. Facing with these two mutually incompatible judgements, I believe
that the judgement derived from the axioms of sustainability and intergen-
erational equity should be given a priority to the judgement derived from
Pareto eﬃciency. So, at the expense of Pareto eﬃciency, we should consider
the existence of second best allocation rules which meet the axioms of sus-
tainability and intergenerational equity as well as the second best eﬃciency
axiom, that would be an open question.
It would be worth commenting on another type of intergenerational eq-
uity. Here, we only discussed the types of welfaristic equity axioms, where the
main informational basis for measuring individual’s wellness was individual’s
subjective preference. However, it is possible to discuss intergenerational eq-
uity by adopting some objective well-being measure. For instance, we may
24consider “J-Reference Maximin principle,” as an intergenerational equity ax-
iom, where J was introduced in axioms of sustainability. Then, it would be
interesting to consider the compatibility of the J-Reference Maximin princi-
ple with J-Reference Human Development in this context.7
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